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July-Aug., 1955
COMMENTS ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE-
PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE
By RICHARD B. HARVEY, Student, University of Denver, College of Law
Recent Colorado decisions involving the doctrine of "last clear
chance" in accident cases have posed problems which suggest the
need for renewed scholarship and precision of expression in this
everyday field of tort law. For example; is an instruction and an
affirmative defense of last clear chance available to a defendant
as was attempted in the very recent case of Rein v. Jarvis?' Is a
plea of last clear chance tatamount to a confession of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff ?2 How should last clear
chance be pleaded under Rules 7 and 8, R.C.P., Colorado? At
what stage in a trial can you amend a complaint under Rule 15
to invoke the doctrine? Must you allege or prove that plaintiff
was in a position of inextricable peril? From the standpoint of
substantive law, has the Supreme Court of Colorado over-ruled
its earlier decisions approving the doctrine of "unconscious last
clear chance ' 3 by holding that "the burden is upon plaintiff to
prove that he was in a place of danger; that defendant discovered
the perilous situation, and that after discovery of plaintiff's dan-
ger, defendant could then have prevented the injury by the use
of reasonable care" ?4
In this article we shall consider our state decisions involving
last clear chance from the approximate advent of the Rules of
Civil Procedure in Colorado in an effort to analyze and clarify the
present status of selected procedural and substantive problems. 5
Perhaps the explanation of the last clear chance doctrine in
Grand Trunk Railwacj Co. of Canada v. Ives 6 by the Supreme
Court of the United States is typical:
. . .Although the defendant's negligence may have
been the primary cause of the injury complained of,
yet an action for such injury cannot be maintained if
the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be
traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the
person injured; subject to this qualification which has
grown up in recent years (having been first enunciated
in Davis v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W 546), that the contribu-
11954-55 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 9, p. 306, 282 P. 2d .... (1955).
2 Barnes v. Wright, 123 Colo. 463, 468, 231 P. 2d 794 (1951).
'Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatherwood, 102 Colo. 460, 79 P. 2d 1052
(1938).
'Werner v. Schrader, 127 Colo .523, 528, 258 P. 2d 766 (1953); quoted in
Anchor Casualty Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 154-55 C. B. A. Adv. Sht.
No. 4, 277 P. 2d 523, 525 (1954).
'For an extensive treatment of theoretical and substantive aspects of last
clear chance in Colorado including a collection of all the Colorado cases to 1929,
see Derogation of the Common Law Rule of Contributory Negligence, by Lau-
rence W. DeMuth, in 7 ROCKY MT.. LAW REV. 161.
'144 U. S. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679, 687, 36 L. Ed. 485, 493.
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tory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the
action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided
the consequences of the injured party's negligence.
Our state Supreme Court considers last clear chance to
be a tool for the analysis of an extended fact situation into two
separate parts in the search for the elusive "proximate" cause of
an accident. 7 Since Colorado cases from the very beginning have
included the language of proximate cause, it is of academic in-
terest only to mention theories of degrees of fault, comparative
negligence, or apportionment of damages which have been ac-
knowledged in other jurisdictions.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
At first blush it might seem that the liberal philosophy of
rules pleading which allows freedom of amendment under Rule
15b, R.C.P., Colo., should make precision of expression and pro-
cedure unimportant in pleading last clear chance. However, in
the 1951 case of Barnes v. Wright,8 our Supreme Court, on the
strength of a timely objection by defendant's counsel in the trial
court, reversed the trial court which had allowed amendment by
interlineation after the evidence was substantially before the jury.
Perhaps the very heart of the problem as to confusion of
language and procedure lies in the failure to distinguish between
the burden of pleading last clear chance on the one hand and the
separable burdens of proof and going forward with evidence on
the other. Certainly a failure to distinguish these terms is the
primary reason for confusion in statements such as "a plea of last
clear chance is an admission of contributory negligence." Failure
to reach a precise understanding of burden of proof is the obvious
explanation of an attempted plea of last clear chance by a defen-
dant.
The burden of pleading refers only to the burden of stating a
claim for relief that will be invulnerable to a pleading or motion
under Rule 12b (5) (for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted) or to a motion for summary judgment under
Rule 56, sections "b" and "c", R.C.P., Colo.
The burden of proof, in its narrow meaning, refers to the risk
of non-persuasion of the jury.9 This burden will normally follow
the burden of pleading and is a duty to the jury or the trier of fact
alone. The penalty for failure to sustain the burden of proof is
simply an adverse verdict upon the facts. It is this burden which
may be said never to shift, but each party may have his own sep-
arate burden dependent upon his pleading. 10
The burden of going forward with evidence is often confused
'Note 3, supra.
$Note 2, supra.
'9 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE, §2485 (3rd. ed., 1940).
"OWigmore, op. cit. §2489.
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with the burden of proof. Wigmore, however, distinguishes the
burden of going forward with evidence by referring to it as the
duty of producing evidence owed to the judge." The penalty for
failure to sustain this burden is a directed verdict under Rule 50.
The burden of going forward with evidence will shift to and fro
during ,the trial as the parties alternately produce enough evidence
as to controversies of fact [to avoid a directed verdict for the
opposite party.
12
PLEADING LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Let us now utilize this precise terminology in an examination
of the burden of pleading last clear chance. Initially, Rule 8e,
R.C.P., Colo., requires the plaintiff in an accident case to make a
short plain statement of the claim of negligence showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8c then forces the defendant to
set forth affirmatively the defense of contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff.
While it seems probable in Colorado that the plaintiff need not
undertake the burden of specifically negating contributory negli-
gence in his complaint, there are probably two exceptions to the
general rule that contributory negligence is an affirmative defense
that must be specially pleaded by the defendant or it will be waived.
The exceptions occur when contributory negligence appears as a
matter of law, either by an allegation in a complaint or by a dis-
closure of contributory negligence as a matter of law from the
plaintiff's own evidence. 13
Although Colorado reports do not indicate that our Supreme
Court has decided the problem of a faulty complaint, an interest-
ing example involves an Oregon case wherein the plaintiff alleged
that the proximate cause of an aircraft accident was the negli-
gence of the defendant in allowing the plaintiff's intestate to rent
and fly a light plane when "visibly intoxicated and considerably
under the influence of intoxicating liquor" at the time of the
rental.14 The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
If it were not for a history of judicial expression, the burden
of pleading last clear chance could be a bit confusing in Colorado.
Rule 7a, R.C.P., Colo., provides for a "complaint and an answer;
and there shall be a reply .to a counterclaim denominated as such
. . - no other pleading shall be allowed except that the court may
order a reply to an answer." Rule 15b provides that "such amend-
ment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to con-
form to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time . . ." Rule 8c also provides that
12 Wigmore, op. cit. §2486.
2 .For a description of the two, aspects of burden-proof and going forward
with evidence-see 9 WIGXoRE, EVIDENCE, §2487 (3rd ed. 1940).
"165 C. J. S. Negligence, §198c, p. 926.
14Adair v. Valley Flying Service, 196 Ore. 479, 250 P. 2d 104 (1952). The
decedent took the plane off the ground, flew up a canyon about 30 feet above
the trees, and made a steep turn into the canyon wall.
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"in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirma-
tively . . . contributory negligence . . . and any other matter con-
stituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
Apparently the die was cast prior to the advent of rules plead-
ing in the case of Bragdon v. Hexter 15 when the court said,
"the last clear chance doctrine, upon which plaintiff relies, is new
matter constituting an affirmative defense to the new matter of
contributory negligence set up in the answer."
In the case of Wendelin v. Ross, 99 Colo. 365, an application
was made by plaintiff and permission was granted to amend the
replication by pleading last clear chance after the testimony was
concluded and the witnesses excused. The majority of the Court
felt that it was an application addressed to the discretion of the trial
court and that the defendant was not prejudiced because all the evi-
dence concerning the accident was admissible under the allegations
of negligence and contributory negligence contained in the plead-
ings as they stood prior to the amendment.
Mr. Justice Bouck registered a sharp and enlightened dissent
explaining that the problems of last clear chance were not within
the scope of the prior pleadings. As authority, the dissenter quoted
the Bragdon case which demanded an affirmative plea of last clear
chance by the plaintiff if it was to be relied upon.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE UNDER RULES PLEADING
Our Supreme Court again endorsed the procedure of pleading
last clear chance as an affirmative defense in the case of Markley
v. Hilkey 16 which was the first case involving the problem of plead-
ing under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Bragdon case was
cited as authority. The Markley case is also authority for a con-
tention that allegations of negligence and denials of same by both
parties coupled with an allegation of contributory negligence by
the defendant will not be construed as a plea of last clear chance.
The reason that such a suggestion could only lead to unorthodox
procedure will be clarified when we examine the burden of proof
later in this discussion. It should suffice to say that the recent
case of Rein v. Jarvis 17 makes it very clear that our Court feels
a plea of last clear chance is not available to a defendant.
The next case in point of time involving the pleading of last
clear chance was the case of Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp."
which was tried in our Federal District Court. The then Circuit
Court on appeal was faced with an assertion that last clear chance
was not available under Colorado law unless affirmatively pleaded.
The Court said that it was not necessary to decide the issue be-
cause the parties with the assent of the trial court had tried the
case on the theory that last clear chance was within the general
86 Colo. 435, 439, 282 P. 568 (1929).
16113 Colo. 562, 567; 160 P. 2d 394 (1945).
"1954-55 C. B. A. Adv. Sht. No. 9, p. 307, 282 P. 2d .... (1955).
18155 F. 2d 808 (C. A. 10th, Colo., 1946).
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issues of negligence and contributory negligence and that the de-
fendant could not be allowed to shift his position for the first time
on appeal.
In the case of Lambrecht v. Archibald,19 the plaintiff pleaded
last clear chance by way of a reply to an affirmative defense of
contributory negligence contained in defendant's answer. Our
Supreme Court endorsed this as a proper method of pleading.
In the trial court the plaintiff Wright in the 1951 case of
Barnes v. Wright 20 alleged negligence on the part of defendant.
Barnes answered by a denial of negligence and an allegation of
contributory negligence. Defendant also filed a counterclaim based
on an allegation of negligence, and this the plaintiff denied. At
the close of the evidence as to the nature of the accident, defendant
moved for dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground
that the evidence conclusively showed plaintiff to be contributorily
negligent. The motion was denied. Thereupon, plaintiff's counsel
sought leave of court to amend the complaint under Rule 15b,
R.C.P., Colo., by alleging last clear chance. Defendant's counsel
made a timely objection to the proposed amendment on the ground
that ilt was not supported by the evidence and that the request had
come too late. Neverthless, the amendment was allowed. Very
little evidence came in after the amendment.
Our Supreme Court reversed the trial court on the twin
grounds argued by defendant's counsel, stating that "she should
have pleaded same (last clear chance) affirmatively which oppor-
tunity was afforded her by way of reply, or at any time upon
motion to amend her complaint prior to trial".21 (emphasis and
insert added) "The decisions of this Court unmistakably lay down
and follow the well settled rule that the doctrine of last clear chance
must be affirmatively pleaded." (citing Bragdon and Markley
cases)
The opinion in the Barnes case implies that there can be an
amendment to bring in last clear chance at any stage in the trial
if, but only if, there has been evidence of last clear chance actually
admitted without objection. Reliance upon this method of getting
last clear chance into the case would obviously be very dangerous
for a timely objection to evidence of last clear chance would keep
both the evidence and the issue out of the case entirely by making
it impossible to amend the complaint after the beginning of trial.
It is of some real significance to note that counsel for de-
fendant in error Wright (who prevailed in the trial court) sought
to prove that last clear chance had actually been pleaded and that
the issue had in fact been tried by consent. As precedent for their
contention, counsel for Wright urged upon the Supreme Court
the case of Swift & Co. v. Young 22 which involved a head-on col-
11 119 Colo. 356, 203 P. 2d 897 (1947).
20123 Colo. 463, 468, 231 P. 2d 794 (1951).
21 Id. at 469.
"107 F. 2d 170 (C. A. 4th, N. C., 1939).
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lision between an automobile and a truck. The court instructed
the jury on last clear chance; plaintiff got judgment; and defen-
dant, as in the Barnes case, appealed on the ground that the in-
struction on last clear chance was neither supported by evidence
nor pleaded by the parties.
The complaint in both the Barnes and Swift cases contained
iery similar wording which in essence alleged negligence in failure
to keep a proper lookout and in failure to keep the car under
reasonable control.
In the Swift case, the Circuit Court affirmed the trial court
instruction with the statement that last clear chance was but one
of the rules of law to be applied in determining whose negligence
was to be deemed the proximate cause of the injury, and that there
would seem to be no occasion for pleading last clear chance where
the negligence of the defendant relied upon for the application of
the doctrine was pleaded as the proximate cause of the injury.
Even though the Swift case was repeatedly cited by defendant
in error in the Barnes case, 23 our Supreme Court held that last
clear chance had not been properly pleaded and that there had in
fact been no trial of the issue by consent. The Court said' that
timely objection by defendant prevented any trial by consent, and
that the doctrine of last clear chance had not been affirmatively
pleaded in the first instance. As proof of the latter holding, the
Court cited the fact that counsel for defendant in error had changed
his position on appeal from a contention that last clear chance had
been pleaded to a contention that late amendment had not been
erroneous. The Supreme Court said further that if the trial court
had been in doubt to the extent that it allowed a late amendment,
then certainly the issue of last clear chance had not been clearly
pleaded.
Our Supreme Court said that "the underlying theory of the
well settled rule that last clear chance must be affirmatively
pleaded, is that it affords timely notice to the opposing party
•..-24 The Court further suggested that under sub-division "b (1)"
of Rule 41, R.C.P., Colo., the trial court could have dismissed plain-
tiff's complaint with the specification that it was not an adjudica-
tion upon the merits rather than to have permitted the amend-
ment.
In summary then, it seems probable that Colorado decisions
dictate that a plaintiff met by an affirmative defense of contribu-
tory negligence must himself seek leave of court under Rule 7 to
reply with plaintiff's affirmative claim of last clear chance. How-
ever, if the defendant allows the issue of last clear chance to be
tried by express or implied consent, he may not successfully object
to an amendment to conform to the evidence. On the other hand,
the plaintiff will not be able to amend to bring in last clear chance
"See Brief of Defendant in Error in the Supreme Court of Colorado, Barnes
v. Wright, Colorado case no. 16,463 (1951).
24 Note 20, supra, at 470.
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at the close of the evidence in the face of a timely objection by
defendant. In rejecting the Swift case as precedent, our Supreme
Court may have indicated an unwillingness to find last clear chance
within the scope of general allegations of negligence and contribu-
tory negligence. It would be preferable to dismiss without preju-
dice under Rule 41 rather than to allow a late amendment of the
complaint. The underlying theory of an affirmative defensive plea
of last clear chance is to give notice to defendant that he must do
more than simply prove contributory negligence to avoid an
adverse verdict.
EFFECT OF PLEADING LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The importance of distinguishing between burden of pleading
and the separable burdens of proof and going forward with evi-
dence is demonstrated by the problem of whether a plaintiff who
pleads last clear chance is bound by his pleadings in an evidential
sense. Is a plea of last clear chance an admission of contributory
negligence in the sense that the defendant is relieved of the bur-
dns of proving and coming forward with evidence upon the issue
of contributory negligence?
What is the meaning of Rule 8e (2), R.C.P., Colo., which
states that "a party may set forth two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternately or hypothetically . . . a party may
also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless
of consistency. . ." (emphasis added)
Since the doctrine of last clear chance ordinarily presupposes
that plaintiff is chargeable with negligence which, but for the
defendant's subsequent negligence would bar recovery, some of
the courts have taken the position that in order to invoke the
doctrine, the plaintiff must confess initial contributory negligence
creating his perilous situation and avoid this admission by setting
up defendant's ultimate negligence. 25 However, the majority of
the courts which have ruled upon the issue have held that an
admission of contributory negligence is not an essential element
of last clear chance pleading.26
In the Bragdon case 21 which was decided under code plead-
ing, our Supreme Court quoted 31 Cyc. 263 as follows: "Under
the code, plaintiff may, in his reply, tender as many issues as he
pleases, so long as they are not inconsistent with the complaint ...
plaintiff may both traverse the defense set up in the answer and
confess and avoid it." The Bragdon case held that a general
denial of the defendant's charge of contributory negligence could
be coupled, in the plaintiff's replication, with an affirmative plead-
ing of the facts showing that the doctrine of last clear chance
was applicable.
25 A. L. R. 2d 288.
Ild. at 289.




The case of Dwinelle v. Union Pacific R. Co. 28 contained
language to the effect that "the doctrine of last clear chance ap-
plies only where plaintiff's negligence is admitted, and he has
the burden of proving it (defendant's last clear chance) as any
other fact." It is conceded that if plaintiff pleaded last clear chance
affirmatively, he would have the burden of proving it. However,
the facts of the case disclose that plaintiff approached a railroad
track at right angles with a windshield so badly frosted that he
could scarcely see the onrushing train which hit him. The con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff was found to be the primary
cause of the accident, but it was established from the facts; it was
not even urged that the plea of last clear chance was binding to
the extent that it relieved defendant of putting on evidence as to
plaintiff's contributory negligence.
In contrast to the blunt words of the Dwinelle case, consider
the following quotation from the case of Lambrecht v. Archibald :29
In order to avail oneself of the last clear chance doc-
trine, one proceeds upon the assumption of negligence
on his part, and notwithstanding which he takes the
position that negligence of the other party to the acci-
dent is the proximate cause of the damages sought to be
recovered. In other words, the plea of last clear chance
is not available unless contributory negligence is present.
The plea of last clear chance is comparable to confession
and avoidance. Here, for purposes of the plea of last clear
chance, plaintiff admits that decendent (plaintiff's hus-
band) was guilty of contributory negligence in crossing
South Broadway between intersections; notwithstanding
which her counsel contends that the husband's death was
proximately caused by defendant's negligence. (emphasis
and insert added)
Let us now compare the italicized expression "one proceeds
upon the assumption" and "for the purpose of the plea . . . plain-
tiff admits . .. . contributory negligence" with the statements that
"the plea of last clear chance is not available unless contributory
negligence is present" and "the plea . . . is comparable to a con-
fession and avoidance." It is here contended that the former
phrases represent the true spirit of last clear chance pleading and
are in no sense binding upon the plaintiff as an admission against
interest. It is submitted that the situation is a perfect example
of a claim or defense stated alternately and regardless of consis-
tency as permitted by Rule 8e (2), R.C.P., Colorado.
As precedent for these contentions, consider the Michigan
case of St. John v. Nichols 30 which held that in order to rely on
the doctrine of last clear chance, the plaintiff need not admit or
2104 Colo. 545, 550, 92 P. 2d 741 (1939).
"119 Colo. 356, 203 P. 2d 897 (1944).
90 331 Mich. 148, 49 N. W. 2d 113 (1951).
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prove his own contributory negligence but is entitled to go to the
jury on the alternative theories (1) that he was free from con-
tributory negligence, (2) but if chargeable therewith, he was
excused therefrom by defendant's subsequent negligence. The
statement from the leading Colorado case of Independent Lumber
Co. v. Leatherwood 31 that the rule of last clear chance is one to
be applied for the analysis or resolution of an extended fact situa-
tion should be recalled.
ANALYSIS OF BURDENS
The true analysis is that plaintiff must plead negligence on
the part of the defendant. The defendant would deny negligent
conduct and affirmatively plead that the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent. Plaintiff would deny any contributory negligence
and alternately plead defendant's last clear chance.
The case would be at issue and the plaintiff must assume the
burden of proving (at the risk of non-persuasion) that defendant's
negligent conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
Plaintiff would meet the burden of going forward with evidence
by a simple showing, for example, that defendant was guilty of
primary negligence in refusing to yield the right of way to plain-
tiff's car on defendant's right under a city right of way ordinance.
Can defendant now rely upon plaintiff's plea of last clear
chance as an admission or confession of contributory negligence
to the end that defendant need not come forward with evidence
on this issue? It is submitted that defendant must shoulder his
own burden of coming forward with evidence. The burden can
be met either by a positive showing that plaintiff was speeding
and inattentive, or by the negative means of relying upon plain-
tiff's own complaint or evidence which might show that plaintiff
was slightly intoxicated. Defendant will be subject to an adverse
directed verdict if he relies upon the plaintiff's last clear chance
plea as an admission of contributory negligence unless the plain-
tiff makes the mistake of making such specific allegations as to
show contributory negligence as a matter of law.
If defendant has met his burden of coming forward with
evidence, we then put the clause "plea or doctrine of last clear
chance is not available unless contributory negligence is present"
into its proper perspective. The statement merely means that
plaintiff need not worry about the burden of proving last clear
chance until defendant has put on evidence of contributory negli-
gence. If defendant put on enough evidence to avoid a directed
verdict, the plaintiff must assume the burden of proving last clear
chance by coming forward with evidence that, in spite of plain-
tiff's peril caused by his own negligence, the defendant must still
respond in damages if defendant subsequently had a clear chance
to avoid plaintiff's injury by the exercise of reasonable care which
"102 Colo. 460, 79 P. 2d 897 (1938).
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tiff's injury.
In testing the correctness of this theory about the effect of a
plea of last clear chance, let us examine the recent Colorado cases.
In the 1951 case of Barnes v. Wright,32 the language of the Lam-
brecht case was picked up and the case cited as follows :-3.
The position taken by the plaintiff in seeking the ap-
plication of the last clear chance was tantamount to a
confession of this negligence which defendant alleged to
be the contributing cause of the injury. Plaintiff's late
plea of last clear chance was not available unless the neg-
ligence on her part .... was contributory. (emphasis
added)
The above quoted language is purely dictum in the Supreme
Court opinion for the plaintiff in error's* contentions were that an
amendment to the complaint and an instruction to the jury on
last clear chance had come too late and that they were not sup-
ported by the evidence. The issues were the late plea and whether
there was in fact a last clear chance on plaintiff in error's part-
not whether plaintiff had been contributorily negligent. The judg-
ment for Wright in the trial court was reversed and remanded for
a new trial on the issues of negligence and contributory negligence
and there is no indication that Wright was to be bound by her plea
of last clear chance as a matter of law though obviously contribu-
torily negligent upon the facts.
In the case of Rosa v. Union Pacific R. Co.34 involving an
action for damages resulting from a collision between a locomotive
and an automobile, the trial court gave a summary judgment to
the railroad on the basis of plaintiff's pleadings (including a plea
of last clear chance) and plaintiff's own deposition. The Supreme
Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings as the parties might desire on the basis that the plead-
ings presented a question of fact for the jury both as to contribu-
tory negligence and as to last clear chance. Counsel for plaintiff
in error took the position that, "admitting for the sake of argu-
ment" plaintiff's contributory negligence, there was still a genu-
ine fact issue involved under the plea of last clear chance which
had to go the jury. The Supreme Court endorsed this view but
granted the reversal upon both issues.
Woods v. Siegrist M is a case in which the plaintiff specifically
pleaded last clear chance but in spite of strong evidence as to con-
tributory negligence the problem was sent to the jury for determin-
ation of fact. The verdict was against contributory negligence and
in favor of plaintiff with the Supreme Court affirming on an "as-
r-Barnes v. Wright, 123 Colo. 463, 468, 231 P. 2d 794 (1951).
Note 29 supra.
".127 Colo. 1, 252 P. 2d 825 (1953).
112 Colo. 257, 149 P. 2d 241 (1944).
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sumption" of contributory negligence for the sake of argument
and recovery on last clear chance. Though the facts are not very
clear in the reported case, there seems to be no binding effect in
the plea of last clear chance.
In the final analysis, last clear chance is a rule of evidence
and not of pleading. It would seem that a plea of last clear chance
should not be given any binding effect in the sense of an admis-
sion against interest for it is properly pleaded alternatively and
without necessity of consistency under the liberal provisions of
Rule 8e (2), R.C.P., Colorado. It is true that you do not reach the
issue of last clear chance unless evidence as to contributory negli-
gence has been produced by the defendant, but it does not follow
that plaintiff must confess or plead his own negligence. It should
be a defendant's burden to come forward with evidence as to con-
tributory negligence when and if plaintiff has produced evidence
as to defendant's primary negligence. Otherwise, the court never
gets to the issue of last clear chance and the defendant's primary
negligence is the only thing before the jury.
It is for this very reason that our Supreme Court in the case
of Rein v. Jarvis 36 stated:
If the doctrine (of last clear chance) could be in-
voked by defendant, it would be a confusing method of
charging plaintiff with contributory negligence. Before
the occasion arises where the doctrine could be invoked,
plaintiff already is barred by his contributory negligence
and would seek this route (last clear chance) out of the
dilemma. (emphasis and inserts added)
NECESSITY FOR ALLEGING DISCOVERY OF PERIL
Most courts which have dealt with the procedural problem
agree that in order to take advantage of the last clear chance
doctrine, the pleader must allege something as to whether the
plaintiff's peril was or should have been known to defendant had
he been exercising reasonable care for the rights of plaintiff, but
there seems to be no unity of expression in form.3 7 The essence
of the allegation will depend upon which of the substantive doc-
trines of last clear chance the forum observes, i.e., the doctrine
of discovered peril (conscious last clear chance), the doctrine of
discoverable peril (unconscious last clear chance), humanitarian
doctrine, and the Missouri doctrine. Colorado seems to have en-
dorsed the first three of these theories in one or more cases.
Werner v. Schrader 38 involved a motorcycle-automobile col-
lision in a city street intersection with Werner as the plaintiff-
cyclist in the trial court. As to discovery of peril, our Supreme
Court said that "the burden is upon plaintiff to prove that he was
in a place of danger; that defendant discovered the perilous situa-
s'1954-55 C. B. A. Adv. Sht. No. 9, p. 306, 282 P. 2d .... (1955).
25 A. L. R. 2d 292 ff.
'127 Colo. 523, 528, 258 P. 2d 766 (1953).
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tion; and that after discovery of plaintiff's danger, defendant
could then have prevented the injury by the use of reasonable
care." The same passage in the Werner case was quoted the fol-
lowing year in the case of Anchor Casualty Co. v. Denver & Rio
Grande R. Co.39 The writer believes that these two cases are really
examples of unconscious last clear chance and that the words "or
should have discovered" have been dropped inadvertently. In fact,
the Anchor case contained these words elsewhere in the opinion,
and both cases are primarily concerned with how clear the last
chance was and not with the problem of discovery.
The difference between the doctrines of conscious and uncon-
scious last clear chance lies in the fact that in the former the
defendant must actually discover the plaintiff's peril in time to be
able to avoid injury to him by the exercise of reasonable care while
in the latter the defendant would or could discover plaintiff's peril
if only he exercised reasonable care as he is bound to do. In both
cases the plaintiff is assumed to be in a position of inextricable
peril.
The leading modern case in Colorado involving the doctrine
of unconscious last clear chance is probably the 1938 case of
Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatherwood 40 in which plaintiff in
error had over 450 feet on a broad and unobstructed city street
to see Leatherwood move from a position of apparent peril into
one of inextricable peril via a left hand turn onto the same north-
bound traffic lane occupied by the company truck. The Supreme
Court declared that the company driver could have discovered
plaintiff's peril in time to have avoided the resulting collision had
the truck driver been exercising reasonable care. The Independent
Lumber Co. case was specifically based upon Section 479 of the
Restatement of Torts and has been cited frequently (including the
Dwinelle case 41).
Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp.42 was tried in our Federal
District Court and involved a negligently inattentive plaintiff who
apparently never saw the street car which hit him. However, the
motorman of the westbound car saw plaintiff when plaintiff was
about five feet behind an east bound car and twenty to twenty-five
feet from the westbound car which struck him. In giving a new
trial to Mills, the Circuit Court applied the humanitarian doctrine
of last clear chance as the substantive law of Colorado and gave
damages to a plaintiff who was inattentive to the extent of not
being aware of peril extricable in nature. Relief was apparently
granted on the theory that since the motorman actually saw the
plaintiff, the motorman failed to use reasonable care by his failure
to sound a warning gong. It is interesting to note that in this
case the Circuit Court was willing to take judicial notice for the
39 1954-55 C. B. A. Adv. Sht. No. 4, 277 P. 2d 523 (1954).
40102 Colo. 460, 465, 79 P. 2d 1052 (1938).
4 104 Colo. 545, 92 P. 2d 741 (1939).
4155 F. 2d 808 (C. A. 10th, 1946).
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first time on appeal that all Tramway cars were equipped with
gongs.
Lambrecht v. Archibald 43 involved a pedestrian plaintiff who
was hit by an automobile while crossing a city street. The evidence
as to speed of the car, visibility, position of pedestrian in relation
to the cross-walk, and other material matters was in hopeless con-
flict. Our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for plaintiff and
approved the following instruction given to the jury :44
A plaintiff who has negligently placed himself in a
position of imminent peril, and is either unconscious of
his peril, or unable to avoid danger, or both, may never-
theless recover . . . if defendant could have avoided in-
jury after he discovered or by exercise of reasonable care
could have discovered the plaintiff's peril.
This instruction makes the Lambrecht case rather difficult to
classify as to type of doctrine for the humanitarian doctrine which
allows recovery to a plaintiff who is unaware of a peril from which
he could otherwise extricate himself normally requires actual dis-
covery on the part of plaintiff. Therefore, it might be willing to
equate unconsciousness on the plaintiff's part with actual inextri-
cable peril and simply apply the doctrine of unconscious last clear
chance to both situations.
In summarizing, it seems fair to say that one pleading last
clear chance in Colorado must allege discovery on the part of the
defendant, but no particular combination of words is required.
The essence of the allegation will depend upon the type of sub-
stantive last clear chance doctrine applicable to the facts, but it is
clear that Colorado courts will uphold an allegation of peril that
could or should have been discovered rather than the stricter view
necessitating actual discovery. Whether our courts will apply the
humanitarian doctrine in its orthodox form wherein there is actual
discovery by defendant of extricable peril on the part of an in-
attentive plaintiff, or whether the court will consider inattention
as inextricable peril and apply unconscious last clear chance would
seem to depend on the particular fact situation or the judge in-
volved in the case.
INEXTRICABLE PERIL AND CONTINUING NEGLIGENCE BY PLAINTIFF
Under orthodox concepts of the substantive doctrines of last
clear chance, it seems clear that the plaintiff must prove that he
found himself in a position of inextricable peril and that the de-
fendant discovered or should have discovered the perilous position
in time to have avoided injury to the plaintiff. Both conscious and
unconscious last clear chance doctrines require inextricable peril;
however, the humanitarian doctrine is applicable in the case of a
plaintiff who is unaware of an extricable peril when the defendant
has actually discovered the peril and inattention.




Much confusion of expression and duplication of research
effort can be eliminated by a realization that inextricable peril and
continuing negligence are reciprocal terms used to describe the
sequence of events prior to and during the moments of peril which
terminate in injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff will seek to es-
tablish his position of inextricable peril, while the defendant will
seek to show that plaintiff's own negligent conduct continued until
the moment of injury. Where one party fails, the other prevails.
A succinct statement of the situation which utilizes the language
of continuing negligence is as follows :45
Under the last clear chance doctrine, if the plaintiff's
negligence placing him in a perilous position has become
static, or a mere condition upon which defendant's negli-
gence operates to cause the injury, the fact that plaintiff
is negligent in getting into that position is not considered
as a proximate cause of the injury so as to deprive him
of a recovery. On the other hand, if plaintiff's negligence
is still active and a contributing factor in causing the in-
jury, it is generally held that he cannot recover under the
last clear chance doctrine.
The Supreme Court of Colorado in the case of Ankeny v.
Talbot 46 used a very clear statement to show the need for proof
of inextricable peril:
One of the essential conditions to application of the
doctrine of last clear chance is that the person relying
upon the doctrine is unable to extricate himself from a
position of peril. (Citing the Independent Lumber Co.
4 7
and Lambrecht 48 cases)
The facts of the Ankeny case involved a head-on crash between
two automobiles. Plaintiff, a stranger on the particular road,
came over the brow of a hill to find defendant's car angling across
the road to plaintiff's side whereupon defendant's car appeared to
straighten out and head toward plaintiff who was by this time on
the shoulder of the road on his own side. Plaintiff testified that
he was blinded by the lights of the oncoming car in the dark night
and assumed that defendant must be on his own side of the road
negotiating an unseen curve. In fact, defendant was driving on
the wrong side of the road preparatory to stopping at a rural
mailbox. After the crash, defendant became a counterclaimant
and the issue was whether defendant's position (plaintiff on
counterclaim) was inextricable. In reversing a trial court judg-
ment for defendant, the Supreme Court held that counterclaim-
ant was not in a position of inextricable peril because he had 600
S4 BLASHFIELD, Part 2, §2814 (Permanent Edition).
48126 Colo. 313, 321, 250 P. 2d 1019 (1952).
4' Note 40 supra.
48 Note 43 supra.
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feet of separation after peril became apparent in which to move
back a few feet to his own side of the road while traveling at ten
to fifteen miles per huor.
Often the question of inextricable peril vs. continuing negli-
gence will be left to the jury. 40 One such case involved a left turn
made by a truck-driver across the path of a streetcar driven by
an inattentive motorman. Another case involved a plaintiff in-
jured in attempting to drive through a railroad yard containing
perils with which plaintiff was very familiar.
In other cases, the plaintiffs have been found guilty of contin-
uing negligence which has disqualified them in their pleas for
relief as a matter of law. In one such case, a truck driver pro-
ceeded down a highway which crossed a railroad track at right
angles for a distance of half a mile with a windshield so badly
frosted over as to prevent effective vision. 0 Another case involved
a woman pedestrian who attempted to cross a residential street in
the middle of a block, became confused as a jeep approached, and
was injured when she ran into the side of the jeep)'
Febling v. Jones 52 is typical of a line of cases which involve
a plaintiff who looked down the street and saw nothing even though
the thing which subsequently injured him was obviously in plain
sight as a matter of physical law. In the Fabling case, the plaintiff
ran out from behind a moving streetcar and into the path of an
automobile traveling in the opposite direction. The plaintiff testi-
fied that her visibility was unobstructed for two blocks and yet
she failed to see the car almost on top of her. The Supreme Court
said that "to have looked in such a manner as to fail to see what
must have been plainly visible was to look without a reasonable
degree of care and is of no more effect that if she had not looked
at all." The Court found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negli-
gence continuing to the time of impact and specifically endorsed
the need for proof of an inextricable peril.
Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp..3 was a case in which a negli-
gently inattentive plaintiff walked out from behind an eastbound
vehicle and across the street into the path of a wesbound vehicle
all the while juggling packages and looking at the ground. The
Supreme Court reversed a trial court judgment for defendant
(which was based on continuing negligence) and applied the hu-
manitarian doctrine which obviated the necessity of proving in-
extricable peril.
ALLEGATIONS As To TIME AND MEANS OF AVOIDING INJURY
Is it necessary to allege or to prove that defendant had time
Denver Tramway Corp. v. Perisho, 105 Colo. 280, 97 P. 2d 422 (1939);
Rosa v. Union Pacific R. Co., 127 Colo. 1, 252 P. 2d 825 (1953).
1 Dwinelle v. Union Pacific R. Co., 104 Colo. 545, 92 P. 2d 741 (1939).
5 Owens v. United States, 194 F. 2d 246 (1952).
52 108 Colo. 144, 114 P. 2d 1100 (1941), quoted in Werner v. Schrader, supra,
note. 38.
53 155 F. 2d 808 (C. A. 10th, 1946).
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to act after plaintiff's peril was or should have been discovered?
Is it necessary to produce evidence showing defendant had thje
capability of avoiding injury with the means at hand in the time
available?
Most of the cases dealing with the above questions seem to
indicate that the problem is basically one of proof rather than
pleading. A general allegation by plaintiff that defendant dis-
covered or should have discovered plaintiff's peril in time to have
avoided injury with the means available to him will support the
necessary proof.
The Dwinelle case ,4 involving the trucker with the frosted
windshield contains a quotation as to time in which to act which
has been quoted time after time.
55
. . . The evidence discloses a mere possibility that
(defendant) might have avoided the collision, and that
possibility rests upon split seconds. This is not enough
time to meet the rule. It may present a last chance, but
not a clear chance.
This case is authority for the proposition that the defendant's
chance to avoid injury must be both clear and last.
The Werner case - makes clear the importance of the time
element by holding that the doctrine of last clear chance pre-
supposes a perilous situation created or existing through the negli-
gence of both plaintiff and defendant, but it is assumed that there
was a time after such negligence had occurred when the defendant
could, and the plaintiff could not, by the use of means available,
avert the accident.
Anchor Casualty Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R. C0.5 1 is a
most interesting and informative case on the problem of whether
defendant could have avoided the accident after the perilous posi-
tion of the plaintiff was or should have been known by defendant.
Through the procedural steps in getting to the Supreme Court
were somewhat complex, the steps boil down to a situation wherein
the insurance company stood in the place of the automobile owner
whose car was hit by a locomotive at a grade crossing near Tolland,
Colorado. The company won a verdict in the trial court but the
defendant's motion for a new trial was granted upon the basis of
an insufficient showing that the train engineer was aware of the
perilous position of the car in time to stop. The insurance carrier
elected to stand on the record and took a dismissal in order to get
to the Supreme Court on error. The Supreme Court decided the
case in favor of the railroad on the precise issue of whether or not
Note 50 supra, at 550.
SBarnes v. Wright, 123 Colo. 463, 231 P. 2d 794 (1951); Owen v. United
States, supra note 51; Ankeny v. Talbot, siupra note 46; Werner v. Schrader,
127 Colo. 523, 258 P. 2d 766 (1953) ; Anchor Casualty Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande
R. Co., 1954-55 C. B. A. Adv. Sht. No. 4, 277 P. 2d 523 (1954).
"Note 55 supra.
" Note 55 supra.
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defendant's locomotive could have been stopped short of the col-
lision after the plaintiff's peril should have been known to the
defendant in the exercise of reasonable care. Counsel for plaintiff
in error strongly urged that the true issue was whether or not the
trial judge had granted a new trial on all the evidence or only upon
that produced by the plaintiff on the above point, but the Supreme
Court did not agree.
The facts and method of proof in the case are a delight to
anyone with a scientific bent. The automobile in question had
failed to negotiate an "S" curve leading across the tracks and had
come to rest across one line with one or more tires blown out. One
occupant of the car proceeded up the track around a curve and
toward the mountains in an effort to flag down the approaching
train with a flashlight since the accident occurred after mid-night.
The engineer testified that he saw a light in the bushes some 1200
feet west of the crossing but assumed that it came from one of
many fishermen who frequented the road at all hours during that
season. The engineer who was on the right side of the cab could
not see the crossing around the curve to the left because of the
70 feet of boiler in front of him. The fireman on the left side of
the cab finally became aware of the obstruction on the track and
called for emergency measures when about 900 feet west of the
crossing. The counsel for the railroad accepted the testimony of
the would be flagman that a warning was given 1200 feet west of
the crossing and then put on evidence showing that the locomotive.
tender, and caboose could not be stopped by the use of brakes and
reverse drive in less than 1375 feet under normal circumstances
taking into account the 2% grade downhill and the one-million
pound weight of the train unit. Counsel also showed that the train
was actually stopped in 1180 feet and by a bit of addition and
substraction (of things like locomotive length, distance of travel
past crossing, and relation of car to crossing) proved that the
locomotive went 67 feet beyond the point of impact in spite of the
exercise of better than reasonable care.
The case really demonstrates the point that the plaintiff must
bear the burden of -proving that the defendant could stop in the
time available. The burden in this case proved no mean one to
bear becuase even with the railroad's own evidence to help, the
plaintiff was never quite able to prove just where that million
pound locomotive could have been stopped.
The Barnes case 58 is another example of the effective use of
diagrams and demonstrative argument on the problem of capa-
bilities after discovery of apparent peril, but mere cars were in-
volved in this case.
The final problem for consideration in this paper deals with
the effect of swerving, turning out, or sounding a warning device
in an effort to avoid injury to plaintiff rather than the basic prob-
lem of accomplishing a complete stop. One case held that the
" Note 55 supra.
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failure to sound a warning gong after peril became apparent was
the proximate cause of injury even though there was no proof
that the tram vehicle could actually have been stopped in time to
avoid injury. 9 Another case found defendant's negligence to be
the proximate cause because he failed to turn the opposite way he
chose to turn in the emergency.60 It is submitted that a better view
would take into account that where a driver of an automobile sud-
denly realizes that he is placed in danger from the negligence of
another, he should not be charged with an error in judgment where
instantaneous action is required."
APPENDIX I
Cases since 1938 in which last clear chance was considered.
See footnote number 5 for reference to collection of all cases be-
fore 1930.
1. Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatherwood, 1938, 102 Colo. 460, 79 P. 2d 1052.
2. Dwinelle v. Union Pacific R. Corp., 1939, 104 Colo. 545, 92 P. 2d 741.
3. Gaede v. Union Pacific R. Corp., 1939, 28 F. Sup. 396 (D. Colo.) Rev. 110
F. 2d 931.-
4. Denver Tramway Corp. v. Perisho, 1939, 105 Cola. 280, 97 P. 2d 422.
5. Fabling v. Jones, 1941, 108 Colo. 144, 114 P. 2d 1100.
6. Woods v. Siegrist, 1944, 112 Colo. 257, 149 P. 2d 241.
7. Welsh v. Union Pacific R. Corp., 1945, 113 Colo. 313, 156 P. 2d 844.
8. Markley v. Hilkey Bros., 1945, 113 Colo. 562, 160 P. 2d 394.
9. Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp., 1946, 155 F. 2d 808 (D. Colo.)
10. Lambrecht v. Archibald, 1949, 119 Colo. 356, 203 P. 2d 897.
11. Pueblo Transport Co. v. Moylan, 1951, 123 Colo. 207, 226 P. 2d 806.
12. Barnes v. Wright, 1951, 123 Colo. 463, 231 P. 2d 794.
13. Owens v. United States, 1952, 194 F. 2d 246 (D. Colo.).
14. Ankeny v. Talbot, 1952, 126 Colo. 313, 250 P. 2d 1019.
15. Rosa v. Union Pacific R. Corp., 1953, 127 Colo. 1, 252 P. 2d 825.
16. Comer v. Dodd, 1953, 127 Colo. 61, 253 P. 2d 600.
17. Patch v. Bowman, 1953, 127 Colo. 424, 257 P. 2d 418.
18. Werner v. Schrader, 1953, 127 Colo. 523, 258 P. 2d 766.
19. Anchor Casualty Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Corp., 1954-55 C.B.A. adv.
Sh. No. 4, 277 P. 2d 523 (1954).
20. Rein v. Jarvis, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sht No. 9, 281 P. 2d 1019 (1955).
"' Note 49 su pra.
"Woods v. Siegrist, 112 Colo. 257, 149 P. 2d 241 (1944).
Ankeny v. Talbot, 126 Cola. 313, 250 P. 2d 1019 (1952).
A CLAUSE OF A LAWYER'S WILL
Here is a clause for your own will or codicil:
"I hereby give and bequeath to THE COLORADO BAR
FOUNDATION, Inc., a Colorado not for profit corporation,
the sum of $ .................... to be used by it for its general
purposes."
Your own interest in the activities of the Foundation
will help you to determine the appropriate figure to put in
the blank after the dollar sign.
